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What have I just done? Anchoring, self-knowledge, and judgments
of recent behavior
Nathan N. Cheek∗ Sarah Coe-Odess∗ Barry Schwartz†
Abstract
Can numerical anchors influence people’s judgments of their own recent behavior? We investigate this question in a
series of six studies. In Study 1, subjects’ judgments of how many anagrams they were given assimilated to numerical
anchors. Subjects’ judgments of how many math problems they correctly solved and how many stairs they had just walked
up were also influenced by numerical anchors (Studies 2A and 3A), and this occurred even when the anchors were extreme
and nonsensical (Studies 2B and 3B). Thus, our first five studies showed that anchors can affect people’s judgments of their
own recent behavior. Finally, in Study 4, we tested the hypothesis that self-knowledge, despite not eliminating anchoring
effects, does still attenuate anchoring. However, we found no evidence that self-knowledge reduced anchoring: subjects’
judgments of their own recent behavior and subjects’ judgments of other people’s recent behavior were equally influenced
by anchors. We discuss implications of these findings for research on domain knowledge and anchoring, as well as for
research on the malleability of memory.
Keywords: anchoring, knowledge, self-knowledge, memory, bias.
1 Introduction
Forty years ago, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) demon-
strated that, when making numerical judgments under un-
certainty, people often fall prey to anchors: relevant or ir-
relevant numbers that influence judgments. For example,
when guessing the length of the Mississippi River, peo-
ple first asked if it is longer or shorter than 2,000 miles
will give a larger estimate than people first asked if it is
longer or shorter than 70 miles (Jacowitz & Kahneman,
1995). Although the number in the first question should
not affect the ultimate judgment of length, since people
know it is incorrect and that it is unlikely to provide help-
ful information, numerical judgments still assimilate to
the numerical anchor. Dozens of studies on anchoring ef-
fects have documented the impressive extent of anchoring
(for reviews, see Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley, 2004;
Furnham & Boo, 2011). Anchoring effects appear to oc-
cur despite forewarning or incentives for accuracy (Epley
& Gilovich, 2005) and regardless of cognitive reflection
(Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009), and they matter
in a wide variety of situations, including estimates of the
likelihood of nuclear war (Plous, 1989), math calculations
We thank Brett Pelham, Dan Grodner, Julie Norem, Jonathan Cheek,
and the editor and two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments on
earlier versions of this article.
Copyright: © 2014. The authors license this article under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
∗Swarthmore College.
†Corresponding author: Department of Psychology, Swarth-
more College, 500 College Avenue, Swarthmore, PA 1908, Email:
bschwar1@swarthmore.edu.
(Smith &Windschitl, 2011), and outcomes of negotiations
(Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001).
The influence of anchors even extends to people’s judg-
ments about their own behavior. Cervone and Peake
(1986), for instance, found that subjects’ predictions of
how many anagrams they could solve were higher when
they were exposed to a high anchor than when they were
exposed to a low one. In a similar study, anchors also
affected subjects’ estimates of how many sentences they
would be able to unscramble (Switzer & Sniezek, 1991).
Additionally, people’s judgments of confidence in their
own performance (e.g., in a signal detection task; Carroll,
Petrusic, & Leth-Steensen, 2009)—as well as the qual-
ity of the performance of others (Thorsteinson, Breier,
Atwell, Hamilton, & Privette, 2008)—are similarly vul-
nerable to anchoring effects.
Despite the vast anchoring literature, however, we know
of no research that has directly examined the effect of an-
chors on people’s judgments of their own recent behavior.
It seems possible, though, that anchors can influence such
judgments, especially given the extent of anchoring effects
in other areas of research. On the other hand, people may
be particularly aware of their own past behavior, and such
knowledge may prevent anchors from affecting their judg-
ment. In other words, whereas when judging future be-
havior (e.g., anagrams to be solved; Cervone & Peake,
1986) people do not have direct self-knowledge to help
them avoid anchoring effects, when judging past behavior,
people may have and be able to draw on self-knowledge to
counteract anchors. We set out to test these possibilities in
the present research.
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1.1 Knowledge and anchoring
The possibility that people’s judgments of their own re-
cent behavior will be immune to anchoring effects receives
support from several studies showing that knowledge at-
tenuates the influence of anchors (e.g., Mussweiler & En-
glich, 2003; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a; Smith, Winds-
chitl, & Bruchmann, 2013). For example, Mussweiler and
Englich (2003) examined the effects of anchoring on price
estimates in Germany during the transition from the Mark
to the Euro. They found that, before the transition, Ger-
man subjects were more susceptible to anchoring when
judging prices in Euros (with which they were less fa-
miliar) than when judging prices in Marks. In contrast,
several months after the transition, when Germany had
adapted to the new currency, the pattern reversed: sub-
jects instead anchored more when using Marks. Simi-
larly, Smith et al. (2013) found that people from the U.S.
were less influenced by anchors when making judgments
about the U.S. then when making judgments about In-
dia, whereas people from India were less influenced by
anchors when making judgments about India than when
making judgments about the U.S.
Furthermore, knowledge may play a particularly impor-
tant role in judgments of one’s own recent behavior. Peo-
ple attend more to self-relevant information and behavior,
and self-referential encoding of information results in bet-
ter recall (e.g., Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Symons
& Johnson, 1997). Accordingly, people’s knowledge of
their own past behavior may be particularly important to
them and may therefore limit the influence of anchoring
to an even greater extent than the more general knowledge
examined in previous studies. Thus, people’s judgment of
their own recent behavior could be completely or partially
immune to anchoring effects.
However, other studies have found less evidence that
knowledge reduces anchoring effects. Englich (2008), for
instance, failed to find any evidence that subject’s knowl-
edge about German cars reduced their susceptibility to an-
chors when making price estimates of cars. Moreover, re-
search on expert judgments has shown that despite their
sophisticated knowledge and experience, real estate agents
(Northcraft & Neale, 1987), judges (Englich, Mussweiler,
& Strack, 2006; Englich & Soder, 2009), and doctors
(Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz, & Bergus, 2007) all exhibit
anchoring effects, even when making judgments in their
areas of expertise and even when anchors are clearly irrel-
evant. Therefore, people’s self-knowledge may not actu-
ally protect them from anchoring effects.
In fact, some previous research hints at the possible in-
fluence of numerical anchors on judgments of past behav-
ior. For example, Loftus (1975) reports that, when people
were asked about the number of headache relief products
they had tried, those asked “In terms of total number of
products, how many other products have you tried? 1? 2?
3?” said they had tried fewer products than those asked
“In terms of total number of products, how many other
products have you tried? 1? 5? 10?” (p. 561). Apparently,
the numbers at the end of the question affected people’s
reports about their own past behavior.
Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) also found evidence
that numerical judgments of past behavior are susceptible
to external influence. They provided subjects with false
feedback about success on a task that involved determin-
ing if suicide notes were real or fake. After completing
the task, subjects were first falsely informed that they had
either been very successful, somewhat successful, or very
unsuccessful. The experimenter then informed subjects
that this feedback was completely false and asked them
to estimate how many notes they had actually correctly
identified. Despite the experimenter’s explanation, sub-
jects who were initially told they had correctly identified
more notes subsequently estimated that they had actually
successfully identified more notes than did subjects who
were initially given more negative feedback. Hence, the
initial evaluation provided by the experimenter influenced
subjects’ later numerical judgments of their own behavior.
Finally, in a study on drug use and memory, Collins,
Graham, Hansen, and Johnson (1985) found that people
appeared to anchor on their current marijuana use when
recalling their previous use more than two years earlier.
Thus, although these previous studies did not use the typ-
ical anchoring paradigm and the effects may not be due to
the same underlying mechanisms as anchoring, they still
provide preliminary evidence that people’s judgments of
their own past behavior may be vulnerable to anchors.
1.2 The present research
In summary, the effects of domain knowledge on anchor-
ing are not unequivocal, but it is surprising that people
with substantial experience in a domain (e.g., in criminal
sentencing or real estate sales) are affected by anchors.
The present studies sought to extend the investigation of
domain knowledge effects to one’s own past behavior. We
conducted six studies to examine whether people fall prey
to anchors even when judging their own recent behavior.
We began by investigating whether anchors affect such
judgments at all (Studies 1, 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B). Then,
upon finding that anchors do influence people’s judgments
of their own behavior, we tested the prediction that, al-
though anchoring effects still occur, they are weaker when
people judge their own behavior than when they judge
other people’s behavior (Study 4).
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2 Study 1
In the first study, subjects completed anagrams and then
estimated how many they had just been given after ex-
posure to a high anchor, a low anchor, or no anchor. If
people’s judgments about their own behavior are immune
to anchoring effects, then judgments of anagrams given
should not differ between anchoring conditions. On the
other hand, if anchors do influence such judgments, es-
timates of anagrams given should be higher in the high
anchor condition than in the low anchor condition.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Subjects
Ninety-two Swarthmore College undergraduates partici-
pated as part of the research requirement for an introduc-
tory psychology class.
2.1.2 Materials and procedure
Subjects completed the study in individual sessions. In
each session, the experimenter sat opposite the subject and
held up index cards with anagrams on them one at a time.
This procedure prevented subjects from easily counting
exactly how many anagrams there were. There were 20 to-
tal anagrams, which ranged from simple (e.g., “hotto” un-
scrambles to “tooth”) to somewhat more challenging (e.g.,
“barked yo” unscrambles to “keyboard”). Subjects had 30
seconds to unscramble each anagram, and if they failed to
do so in the time allotted, the experimenter provided the
correct answer and moved on to the next anagram.
After going through the 20 anagrams, subjects com-
pleted a brief questionnaire that contained three filler ques-
tions (e.g., “How much did you enjoy solving the ana-
grams?”) and then the main dependent measure. In the
high-anchor condition (n = 31), subjects were asked “Do
you think you were given more or less than 30 anagrams?”
followed by “How many anagrams do you think you were
given?” In the low-anchor condition (n = 32), subjects
were instead asked “Do you think you were given more or
less than 10 anagrams?” followed again by “How many
anagrams do you think were given?” In the baseline con-
dition (n = 29), subjects did not receive an anchor; the
baseline questionnaire contained only the question “How
many anagrams do you think you were given?”
2.2 Results and discussion
A one-way between subjects ANOVA showed that anchors
did influence subjects’ judgments, F(2, 89) = 5.05, p =
.008. Post hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD indicated that
estimates of anagrams completed were significantly lower
in the low-anchor condition (M = 17.84, SD = 5.35) than
estimates in the high-anchor condition (M = 22.48, SD =
5.55) at the p = .006 level. Subjects’ estimates in the base-
line condition (M = 19.86, SD = 6.51) did not differ from
either the high-anchor or low-anchor conditions, p = .193
and .368, respectively. Thus, these results provide prelim-
inary evidence that people’s judgments of their own be-
havior are, in fact, susceptible to anchoring effects.
Although an anchoring effect did emerge, a possible
limitation of this study is that subjects were not techni-
cally tracking their own behavior. Because they estimated
how many they were given, rather than how many they
completed, it may be that subjects did not use information
about their behavior when answering the question. De-
spite the fact that they were involved in the anagram task,
and thus it was to a certain extent self-relevant, they may
have perceived the question as asking about the experi-
menter’s behavior or the experimental situation more gen-
erally. As a result, the findings of this study do not defini-
tively show that anchoring can influence people’s judg-
ments of their own recent behavior. We provide a more
direct test in next study.
3 Study 2A
To examine more directly the effect of anchors on peo-
ple’s judgments of their own behavior, we presented sub-
jects in Study 2A with 22 simple math problems and asked
them to estimate how many problems they had correctly
completed, thus ensuring that they were explicitly judging
their own recent behavior. The problems were designed to
be easy enough that most subjects would be able to cor-
rectly solve all of them.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Subjects
One hundred eighty-one subjects completed the study
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; see
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) in exchange for
$0.25. To be included in data analyses, subjects had to
answer all 22 problems correctly. In addition, they had to
correctly answer three attention check questions presented
after the main study (e.g., “In the following sentence, what
is the fourth word after the semicolon? Mary was disap-
pointed about losing the game; however, she was relieved
that the soccer season was now over.”). Only the 109
subjects who met these inclusion criteria were included
in analyses.1
1Including all subjects in analyses did not change the pattern of the
results, and all differences remained statistically significant.
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3.1.2 Materials and procedure
Subjects completed 22 simple math problems (e.g., 27 −
4 =?), which were presented one at a time. After answer-
ing all problems, subjects completed a brief questionnaire
that contained three filler questions (e.g., “How much did
you enjoy solving the math problems?”) followed by the
main dependent measure. In the low-anchor condition (n =
37), subjects were first asked “Do you think you correctly
solved more or less than 11 math problems?” followed
by “How many math problems do you think you correctly
solved?” In the high-anchor condition (n = 42), subjects
were first asked “Do you think you correctly solved more
or less than 33 math problems?” followed again by “How
many problems do you think you correctly solved?” In
the baseline condition (n = 30), subjects did not receive
an anchor; the baseline questionnaire contained only the
question “How many problems do you think you cor-
rectly solved?” Subjects then completed the three atten-
tion check questions.
3.2 Results and discussion
A one-way ANOVA revealed that anchors did influence
subjects’ judgments of their own behavior, F(2, 106) =
59.11, p < .001. Post hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD in-
dicated that estimates of problems correctly solved were
significantly higher in the high-anchor condition (M =
29.17, SD = 8.23) than in either the low-anchor (M =
16.46, SD = 3.46) or baseline (M = 15.87, SD = 4.89)
conditions, p < .001. The latter two conditions did not
differ from each other, p = .917. Thus, the results of Study
2A provide evidence that even people’s judgments of their
own recent behavior are not immune from the influence
of anchoring. Despite the fact that all subjects correctly
completed the same number of problems, subjects in the
high-anchor condition estimated that they had completed
more problems than did subjects in the low-anchor condi-
tion.
It is interesting that, while subjects in the high-anchor
condition made significantly higher estimates than sub-
jects in both the low-anchor and baseline conditions, the
latter two conditions did not differ significantly. That is,
only the high anchor appeared to impact subjects’ judg-
ments. The absence of an anchoring effect in the low-
anchor condition is somewhat surprising, but this result
may have occurred because the low anchor was too high;
perhaps a lower anchor would have influenced subjects’
judgments. Another potential explanation could be that
high anchors simply have a stronger influence than low
anchors do, perhaps because a floor effect limits the ef-
fect of low anchors and lessens the likelihood that subjects
will make a judgment below a certain point. This possibil-
ity is consistent with research by Jacowitz and Kahneman
(1995), who found that high anchors influenced judgments
more than low anchors did. Of course, a ceiling effect
could also conceivably exist for high anchors, though it
may be less noticeable in the present design. Future re-
search on possible differences between high and low an-
chors could address this question.
Additionally, although an anchoring effect did emerge,
it is possible that subjects did not actually see the anchors
as irrelevant; they may have thought the anchors provided
information or hints, or served some other relevant pur-
pose (see, e.g., Schwarz, 1994). To rule out this possi-
bility, in Study 2B, we replicated Study 2A with extreme
anchors that could not possibly be the correct answer.
4 Study 2B
Previous researchers have used a range of methods to min-
imize the likelihood that subjects view anchors as informa-
tive. Tversky and Kahneman (1974), for instance, used a
spinning wheel to generate the anchor values randomly for
subjects. Other studies (e.g., Smith & Windschitl, 2011;
Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell, & Jarvis, 2001) have
employed extreme and implausible anchors to limit the
extent to which subjects see the anchors as informative
hints. In Study 2B, we adopted the latter strategy, repli-
cating Study 2A using anchors that were very extreme and
implausible. If anchoring still occurs despite the fact that
the anchor values are clearly extreme and implausible—
for example, the extreme low anchor in this study is a neg-
ative number, which is not a possible correct answer—then
the effect of numerical anchors on judgments of recent be-
havior cannot be fully explained by subjects’ reliance on
anchors as relevant information or hints (Schwarz, 1994).
4.1 Method
Ninety subjects completed the study in exchange for $0.25
throughMTurk. Data from 66 additional subjects were ex-
cluded for failing to meet the inclusion criteria described
in Study 2A.2 The procedure was exactly the same as in
Study 2A, except that there were only two conditions:
the extreme-low-anchor condition and the extreme-high-
anchor condition. After solving the 22 math problems,
subjects in the extreme-low-anchor condition (n = 44)
were asked “Do you think you correctly solved more or
less than −128 problems?” before estimating how many
they correctly solved, whereas subjects in the extreme-
high-anchor condition (n = 46) were asked “Do you think
you correctly solved more or less than 172 problems?” be-
fore estimating how many they correctly solved.
2Including all subjects in analyses did not change the pattern of re-
sults, though the difference between conditions was no longer statisti-
cally significant.
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4.2 Results and discussion
As in Study 2A, anchors influenced subjects’ judgments of
their own recent behavior. Subjects in the extreme-high-
anchor condition estimated that they had completed sig-
nificantly more math problems (M = 24.13, SD = 9.33)
than subjects in the extreme-low-anchor condition (M =
19.73, SD = 7.49), t(88) = 2.46, p = .016. This was true
despite the fact that subjects in both conditions correctly
completed the same number of math problems and despite
the extremity of the anchors. In line with previous re-
search (e.g., Wegener et al., 2001), the difference between
the high and low anchoring conditions was smaller when
the anchor values were implausible; nonetheless, a clear
difference between high and low anchors emerged. Thus,
the influence of numerical anchors on subjects’ judgments
cannot be completely explained by a reliance on anchors
for information or hints.
5 Study 3A
The results of the previous studies demonstrate that an-
chors can influence people’s judgments of their own recent
behavior. The studies have thus far relied on mental tasks
(i.e., solving anagrams or math problems), and in Study
3A we extended our investigation of anchoring effects to a
more physical activity. Specifically, subjects walked up a
flight of stairs and then immediately estimated how many
stairs they had just walked up.
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Subjects
One hundred forty-two Swarthmore College undergradu-
ates participated as part of the research requirement for an
introductory psychology class.
5.1.2 Procedure
Subjects followed the experimenter up a flight of stairs
with 23 stairs. There was a door at the top of the stairs,
and once the experimenter and subject had walked through
the doorway and closed the door, the experimenter imme-
diately asked subjects to answer one or two questions, de-
pending on condition. In the high-anchor condition (n =
47), the experimenter first asked subjects, “Do you think
you just walked up more or less than 35 stairs?” followed
by “How many stairs do you think you just walked up?”
In the low-anchor condition (n = 47), the experimenter in-
stead asked, “Do you think you just walked up more or less
than 11 stairs?” followed again by “How many stairs do
you think you just walked up?” In the baseline condition
(n = 48), the experimenter only asked subjects to estimate
how many stairs they had just walked up.
5.2 Results and discussion
A one-way between subjects ANOVA revealed that an-
chors affected subjects’ judgments, F(2, 139) = 15.03, p
< .001. Post hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD indicated
that subjects in the high-anchor condition estimated that
they had just walked up significantly more stairs (M =
28.00, SD = 7.26) than subjects in both the low-anchor
(M = 19.87, SD = 7.13) and baseline (M = 23.21, SD =
7.29) conditions at the p < .001 and p = .004 level, respec-
tively. There was a nearly significant two-tailed difference
(although the hypothesis is arguably one-tailed) between
the latter two conditions, p = .067. Thus, judgments of
recent physical behavior are also susceptible to numerical
anchors.
6 Study 3B
As with Study 2B, we replicated study 3A using extreme
and implausible anchors (including a nonsensical negative
anchor) to rule out the possibility that an anchoring effect
emerged only because subjects assumed anchors provided
useful information or hints (e.g., Schwarz, 1994).
6.1 Method
Seventy-five Swarthmore College undergraduates partic-
ipated as part of the research requirement for an intro-
ductory psychology class (data from one subject were
excluded due to poor comprehension of the task). The
only difference in the procedures of Study 3A and Study
3B was that Study 3B contained only two conditions:
the extreme-low-anchor condition and the extreme-high-
anchor condition. After walking up the 23 stairs, subjects
in the extreme-low-anchor condition (n = 37) were asked
“Do you think you just walked up more or less than −31
stairs?” before estimating how many they had just walked
up, whereas subjects in the extreme-high-anchor condition
(n = 37) were asked “Do you think you just walked up
more or less than 77 stairs?” before estimating how many
they had just walked up.
6.2 Results and discussion
As in Study 3A, anchors influenced subjects’ judgments
of their own recent behavior. Specifically, subjects in the
extreme-low-anchor condition (M = 25.30, SD = 7.77) es-
timated that they had just walked up fewer stairs than did
subjects in the extreme-high-anchor condition (M = 34.54,
SD = 11.14), t(64.32) = −4.14, p < .001. Thus, the influ-
ence of numerical anchors on subjects’ judgments cannot
be completely explained by a conscious reliance on an-
chors for information or hints.
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7 Study 4
In light of the previous studies, it appears that anchors
can influence people’s judgments of their own mental and
physical behavior. However, these results do not rule
out the possibility that knowledge matters; rather, it may
be that knowledge only attenuates—but does not actually
eliminate—anchoring effects in judgments of recent be-
havior. Therefore, in Study 4 we tested the prediction
that anchors would have a stronger influence when peo-
ple judged other people’s recent behavior than when they
judged their own. If knowledge does matter, people should
be less susceptible to anchors when judging their own be-
havior than when judging someone else’s. In this study,
we had subjects either complete paper and pencil mazes
or observe someone else complete paper and pencil mazes,
and then estimate how many mazes were completed.
7.1 Method
7.1.1 Subjects
One hundred ninety-four Swarthmore College undergrad-
uates participated as part of the requirement for an intro-
ductory psychology course. Four additional subjects par-
ticipated but did not correctly or completely fill out the
post-maze questionnaire.
7.1.2 Materials and procedure
Subjects completed the study in pairs. Based on the re-
sults of a coin flip, one member of the pair was assigned
to be the “solver” and the other was assigned to be the “ob-
server.” The solver completed 18 relatively simple mazes;
the observer watched the solver complete the mazes. Af-
ter the solver completed the mazes, both the solver and the
observer completed a brief questionnaire. Both question-
naires asked about the solver’s experience and behavior;
thus, whereas solvers judged their own behavior, observers
judged the behavior of someone else. This distinction was
the knowledge manipulation.
The solver questionnaire contained three filler ques-
tions (e.g., “Describe any strategies you used to finish the
mazes”) and then the anchoring questions. In the low-
anchor condition (n = 34), solvers were first asked “Do
you think you completed more or less than 9 mazes?”
followed by “How many mazes do you think you com-
pleted?” In the high-anchor condition (n = 33), solvers
were instead first asked “Do you think you completed
more or less than 27 mazes?” followed by “How many
mazes do you think you completed?” In the baseline con-
dition (n = 31), solvers were only asked “Howmany mazes
do you think you completed?”
The observer questionnaire also contained three filler
questions (e.g., “Describe any strategies you noticed your
Figure 1: Estimates of number of mazes completed.
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partner using to finish the mazes”) and then the anchor-
ing questions. In the low-anchor condition (n = 32), ob-
servers were first asked “Do you think your partner com-
pleted more or less than 9 mazes?” followed by “How
many mazes do you think your partner completed?” In
the high-anchor condition (n = 32), observers were instead
first asked “Do you think your partner completed more or
less than 27 mazes?” followed by “How many mazes do
you think your partner completed?” In the baseline con-
dition (n = 32), observers were asked only “How many
mazes do you think your partner completed?”
7.2 Results and discussion
Results from Study 4 are presented in Figure 1. We con-
ducted a 3 (anchor condition: high vs. low vs. baseline) x
2 (role condition: solver vs. observer) ANOVA to examine
the effects of anchor type and knowledge on judgments of
recent past behavior. There was a significant main effect
of anchor type, F(2, 188) = 28.32, p < .001. There was
no main effect of role, F(2, 188) = 1.66, p = .200, nor was
there an interaction, F(2, 188) = 1.0, p = .371. To examine
the effect of the anchors on judgments of recent behavior
more closely, we pooled data from solvers and observers
and conducted a one-way ANOVA, F(2, 191) = 28.29, p <
.001. Post hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD indicated that
subjects in the high-anchor condition estimated that more
mazes were completed (M = 18.63, SD = 4.75) than sub-
jects in the low-anchor condition (M = 12.97, SD = 3.48)
at the p < .001 level and they estimated that more mazes
were completed than subjects in the baseline condition (M
= 16.05, SD = 4.63) at the p = .002 level. Subjects in
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the low-anchor condition estimated that fewer mazes were
competed than subjects in the baseline condition at the p
< .001 level.
The results of Study 4 provided no evidence that self-
knowledge attenuated the effect of numerical anchors:
there was no difference between the anchoring of ob-
servers and that of solvers, despite the fact that solvers
should have had more knowledge about their own re-
cent behavior. This is particularly surprising given that
self-knowledge is privileged in memory and recall (e.g.,
Rogers et al., 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997), and
thus if general knowledge does reduce anchoring, self-
knowledge should, if anything, reduce anchoring even
more. Thus, our results fit better with previous studies
suggesting that the importance of knowledge in anchor-
ing is at least limited (e.g., Brewer et al., 2007; Englich,
2008; Englich et al., 2006) than with those positing an im-
portant role for knowledge (e.g., Mussweiler & Englich,
2003; Smith et al., 2013).
One possible explanation for the lack of influence of
self-knowledge is that, although subjects had knowledge
that could have potentially attenuated the effect of an-
chors, they were not motivated to use it. In other words,
perhaps only when subjects are motivated to be accurate
and use their knowledge does knowledge reduce anchor-
ing effects. However, while this may be an interesting av-
enue for future research, it is also worth noting that pre-
vious research has provided little support for the hypoth-
esis that motivation attenuates or eliminates anchoring.
For instance, Epley and Gilovich (2005) offered financial
incentives to increase the motivation of subjects making
judgments in the standard anchoring paradigm and found
no difference between the anchoring effects of subjects
offered incentives and subjects in the control condition.
Moreover, Epley and Gilovich (2006) found that neither
cognitive busyness nor alcohol consumption reduced an-
choring in the standard paradigm. Taken together, these
results imply that relatively high motivation or availabil-
ity of cognitive resources do not necessarily translate into
more accurate or less anchored judgments.
8 General discussion
Across six studies, we found that numerical anchors do in-
fluence people’s judgments of their own recent behavior.
In Studies 1 and 2A, we found that people’s estimates of
the number of anagrams they were given or the number of
math problems they correctly solved assimilated to numer-
ical anchors. We then showed in Study 2B that this effect
could was not merely because people viewed the anchors
as informative: even absurdly extreme anchors influenced
people’s judgments of the number of math problems they
correctly solved. Studies 3A and 3B extended these results
to a more physical activity: anchors also affected people’s
estimates of the number of stairs they had just walked up.
Finally, in Study 4 we tested the hypothesis that, al-
though people’s self-knowledge does not protect them
from the influence of anchors, it does make them less sus-
ceptible. Self-knowledge did not appear to reduce anchor-
ing effects: people were equally susceptible to anchors
when judging their own recent behavior as they were when
judging the recent behavior of someone else. This finding
contrasts with previous studies that have found that do-
main knowledge can reduce anchoring (e.g., Smith et al.,
2013), and suggests that there are at least limitations to
the extent to which knowledge attenuates anchoring (e.g.,
Brewer et al., 2007; Englich, 2008; Englich et al., 2006;
Northcraft & Neale, 1987). Future research might imple-
ment a stronger knowledge manipulation to further inves-
tigate the role of knowledge; for example, perhaps if ob-
servers were engaged in a distractor task, and thus could
not pay as close attention to the maze activity, they would
subsequently be more susceptible to anchors. Nonethe-
less, our results suggest that knowledge does not reduce
anchoring in all cases.
8.1 Implications and future directions
Beyond demonstrating that people’s judgments of their
own recent behavior are susceptible to anchors, our re-
sults underline the potential malleability of memory (e.g.,
Loftus, 2005). A large literature has documented the ex-
tent to which memories can be shaped by the way ques-
tions are asked. For instance, in a classic study, Lof-
tus and Palmer (1974) found that after watching a video
of a car accident, people estimated that the speed of the
cars was faster when asked how fast the cars were mov-
ing when they “smashed into each other” than when asked
how fast they were moving when they “hit each other”.
These studies reveal that subtle linguistic cues can alter
people’s judgments of past events, and our anchoring stud-
ies extend research on memory to show that exposure to
numbers, even irrelevant ones, can similarly influence nu-
merical judgments about the past.
Perhaps the application of research on the malleability
of memory that has received the most attention from re-
searchers is eyewitness testimony (e.g., Wells & Loftus,
2013). This line of research is important because despite
the fact that eyewitness testimony is vulnerable to influ-
ences like leading questions (e.g., Loftus & Zanni, 1975),
juries tend to find witnesses extremely convincing (e.g.,
Nicholson, Yarbrough, & Penrod, 2014). Given that the
present research found evidence that numerical anchors
represent yet another potential influence on judgments of
the past, future research may benefit from exploring the
effect of numerical anchors in a context more directly re-
lated to eyewitness memory and testimony. Future studies
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could, for example, investigate the possibility that anchors
influence judgments of the number of people present at the
scene of a crime, or the number of times a witness asked
for help.
Future research might also investigate potential means
of reducing or preventing the influence of numerical an-
chors on judgments of recent behavior. One possible strat-
egy for debiasing judgments of the past derives from the
Selective Accessibility Model (SAM) of anchoring (Chap-
man & Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler, 2003; Mussweiler &
Strack, 1999, 2000b; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Ac-
cording to the SAM, anchoring in the standard paradigm
occurs in two stages that result from the two questions in
the standard anchoring paradigm (i.e., the first, compar-
ative question and the second, absolute question). The
first stage occurs when people answer the comparative
question (e.g., “Do you think you completed more or less
than 9 mazes?”). When answering the comparative ques-
tion, people compare the target value (e.g., the number of
mazes completed) with the anchor value (e.g., 9) and in
doing so, selectively activate anchor-consistent knowledge
(Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). For example, subjects in
Study 4 who received 9 as an anchor may have thought
about the fact that the mazes took relatively little time to
complete, and thus there were probably not very many
mazes. Consequently, anchor-consistent information be-
comes more available, whereas anchor-inconsistent infor-
mation is less available (Chapman & Johnson, 1999). The
second stage of the SAM then occurs when people answer
the absolute question (e.g., “How many mazes did you
complete?”). Because anchor-consistent information has
been made more available in the first stage, it is heavily re-
lied upon by people to answer the absolute question (e.g.,
Higgins, 1996). Therefore, because the available informa-
tion is anchor-consistent, people’s answers are biased in
the direction of the anchor (Mussweiler, 2003; Mussweiler
& Strack, 1999, 2000b).
In addition to providing an explanation of anchoring,
the SAM also provides a strategy for debiasing judgments.
Given that the process of answering the comparative ques-
tion increases the availability of anchor-consistent infor-
mation, increasing the availability of anchor-inconsistent
information should help to debias subsequent answers to
the absolute question (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Muss-
weiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000). One way to increase the
availability of anchor-inconsistent information is to have
people directly consider such information. For example, in
one study (Mussweiler et al., 2000, Study 1), car experts
were exposed to high and low anchors before estimating
the appropriate price of a car. Half of the experts were
asked to generate anchor-inconsistent arguments (e.g., the
car has too much damage for the high anchor to be ap-
propriate) before making an absolute judgment. The gen-
eration of anchor-inconsistent information then led to a
weaker, though still significant, anchoring effect.
This consider-the-opposite strategy may also diminish
the influence of numerical anchors on people’s judgments
of their own recent behavior. Future studies might there-
fore build on the present research by examining the effect
of having subjects generate reasons why their recent be-
havior was inconsistent with the numerical anchor. For
instance, if, after being asked if they completed more or
less than 27 mazes, subjects first considered the fact that
the relative speed with which they completed the mazes
was inconsistent with having completed that many mazes,
might their subsequent estimates be less biased? Future re-
search on both the susceptibility of people’s judgments of
their behavior to sources of bias and methods of reducing
such bias will prove useful in furthering understanding of
the interactions between knowledge, anchoring, and judg-
ments of the past.
9 Conclusion
In conclusion, the present research showed that people’s
judgments of their own recent behavior are susceptible to
numerical anchors, and that self-knowledge does not nec-
essarily reduce the influence of anchors. Thus, despite the
faith people may place on their memories of the past, es-
pecially those of their own actions, our results serve to
underline the fact that memories can be far from perfect
and robust, even ones from only moments ago.
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